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”There are two things that are important in
politics. The first is money –and I can’t remember
what the second one is”.
Mark Hanna, the political boss who masterminded William
McKinley’s 1889 presidential bid.1
Introduction
This report addresses the problem of foreign funding of political parties in
newly democratised African states. Norway has been reluctant to support the
political parties directly as part of its democracy assistance strategy2, but as
indicated by the former Minister of International Development, Anne Kristin
Sydnes, in her statement to the Storting, 24 April 2001, this is about to
change:
“I also wish to draw the political parties in the Storting into
development co-operation. The parties provide a sound grass-
roots basis for development policy, and they possess expertise in
democracy-building. The parties that are represented in the
Storting can make a greater contribution to the development of
properly functioning, pluralistic party systems and democratic
conditions in developing countries. By co-operating on long-
term, democratic organisational development through
knowledge transfers, advice and international exchanges, we will
improve the opportunities for reducing poverty.”
First, we identify some problems associated with the development of political
parties in Africa and indicate how funding may contribute to resolving these
problems. Second, we explain what is meant by the concept of political
funding. Third, we present some models of foreign party funding that may act
as models for the future Norwegian support programme. Fourth, we review
the status of Norwegian parties’ involvement in party supporting activities in
new democracies. Five, we discuss the pros- and cons- of foreign party
funding. Lastly, if Norwegian funding for parties is introduced, we address
some problems one should avoid and indicate an organisational model that
may limit some of the inherently problematic aspects of foreign funding while
at the same time make a meaningful contribution to building democratic and
sustainable multi-party systems.
                                           
1 Here cited from The Economist, Oct. 23, 1999.
2 Apart from the secretive support for the ANC in South Africa up to 1994 and the recent
donations to the Serbian opposition parties.
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1. Political parties and democratisation
International support for democratisation processes is estimated to total US$ 2
billion annually (Burnell 2000). Assistance to democratisation has been
directed at:
- government institutions; such as parliaments, electoral and human rights
commissions, and local government reform, and
- civil society organisations, political parties and independent media
organisations, and
- election processes.
Most donors, including Norway, have put an emphasis on the civil society
organisations, which often were the leading forces behind the transitions from
one-party or military rule to some form of multiparty democracy. But as
argued by Carothers (2002: 19):
“In dominant-power systems, democracy promoters should
devote significant attention to the challenge of helping to
encourage the growth of alternative centres of power. Merely
helping finance the proliferation of non-governmental
organisations is an inadequate approach to this challenge. Again,
political party development must be a top agenda item.
Especially through measures aimed at changing the way political
parties are financed. It should include efforts to examine how
the over-concentration of economic power…can be reduced as
well as measures that call attention to and work against the
blurring of the line between the ruling party and the state”.
As new democracies move from a transitional phase to a consolidation phase,
there is a need to build institutions that can support not only pro-poor policies
but can check for executive dominance and abuse of state authority. It is for
this reason there is a need to build functioning parties and vibrant party
systems. Parties are the ‘engine room’ of democratic polities as they structure
the competition between societal groups and interests. The main argument in
favour of parties is that they provide a mechanism by which citizens can hold
the political leadership accountable.
As outlined in the main part of the report3, the parties in African states are
characterised by:
- a dominant party system,
- a fragmented party system, and
- weak parties.
A dominant party system is one in which one party tends to win an excessive
number of seats in the legislature and/or retain governing power continuously.
In the two longest surviving African multi-party systems, Botswana and
                                           
3 Rakner L. & Svåsand L. 2002 “Multiparty elections in Africa’s new democracies” CMI
Report R 2002: 7.
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Zimbabwe, one party has controlled a majority of parliamentary seats and
held the presidency since independence was achieved. Also in newer
democracies, there is a tendency for the winning party to be returned with
overwhelming majorities, such as the ANC in South Africa and SWAPO in
Namibia. Democratisation has in several states meant that the former single-
party regime has been able to continue in office, such as in Kenya and in
Tanzania. Part of the opposition’s problem is the allegation that the state-
carrying party makes use of governmental resources for party purposes. As
most opposition parties are cut off from access to public funds, they are
disadvantaged in the electoral process. We also see that opposition parties are
not to the same degree as the incumbents able to get donations from
businessmen. Incumbency in many African countries also means that the
governing party is able to profit from kickbacks on government contracts and
sale of state assets. State control of important media, like radio, television and
newspapers, creates an unbalanced playing field during election time and
reduces the opposition’s ability to function as a corrective and an alternative
to the government. Increasing the resources for the opposition parties would
therefore create a more level playing field.
In addition to the opposition parties being smaller electorally than the
governing party, the opposition is also fragmented. For example, the Zambian
party system now consists of more than 30 parties, and although several of
these probably exist on paper alone, a substantial number of them run
candidates in this year’s presidential, parliamentary and local council
elections. A fragmented party system reinforces the power of the dominant
party. Combined with the first past the post electoral system, as we find in
former British colonies, the opposition does not offer a challenge to the
incumbent party in parliament. While increasing the capacity of the opposition
would in principle improve the democratic quality of such states, a
disadvantage could be a perpetuation of the fragmented party system.
African parties are generally weak in several meanings of the term. Firstly,
they tend to be fluid organisations with little capacity to exist over time. This
inhibits the electorate’s ability to evaluate a party’s performance over time and
offers few cues to the voters as to what they can expect of a party in the
future. Secondly, most parties have trouble establishing a durable network of
organisations across the territory. Thus, only a part of the electorate may
actually have a range of parliamentary candidates to choose among. Increased
resources for parties would presumably enable them to establish a broader
territorial presence. Thirdly, African parties are weak in terms of developing a
comprehensive political vision. Instead, they tend to be heavily dependent on
individual personalities.
While the development of several parties that are able to sustain themselves
over time is a necessary ingredient in democratic consolidation, there is a limit
to how many parties a political system can accommodate and still provide a
government that is able to survive for one or more electoral terms. Thus, it is a
difficult balancing act in democracy assistance to enhance the conditions for a
multi-party system without contributing to executive paralysis.
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2. The concept of political finance
While funding of political parties is intrinsically understood to be crucial, it
nevertheless is an ambiguous concept. With political funding we mean: the
way that political parties and individual candidates running for political office
raise funds for election campaigns and, in the case of political parties, for
maintaining themselves as organisations.
Political finance is a complex political phenomenon to understand. The topic
itself is not very transparent. Even in countries that in general have great
openness with regard to information from official and private sources,
information about political finance is incomplete, across parties and across
time, and it is hard to specify the impact of finance on political outcomes, for
instance for election results.
In spite of the problems in estimating the precise impact of political finance
there is little doubt that the actors themselves, parties and candidates, believe
it is important. The very fact that such information is not easily available
proves that it is considered important. Moreover, in most countries there is an
acknowledged need to have some kind of regulation of political finance. Total
absence of regulation, it is feared, will lead parties and candidates to be
controlled by important donors. We can distinguish between four sources of
political finance that in general are considered legitimate, although all of these
forms may not be permitted in all countries:
a) resources mobilised by the political parties themselves, such as membership
fees, taxes on representatives, income from property, publications and
subsidiaries controlled by the party,
b) contributions from individuals,
c) contributions from collective actors; such as by unions and other
organisations and corporations etc, and
d) subsidies from the state or other tiers of government.
In addition, some countries differentiate between financial support from
domestic sources and international sources, to which we return below.
Political finance refers generally to monetary contributions and normally
excludes other forms of contributions, although these may have important
financial implications. Examples of this kind of party support are free radio
and TV time during election campaigns, support for the press or for
organisations affiliated with parties.
Political parties are complex organisations consisting of multiple levels (local,
regional and national) and multiple units (the central party organisation,
ancillary organisations for youth, women etc, or the group of elected officials)
at each level. With regard to public funding of parties it is necessary to specify
what unit in the party it is that receives contributions. Public subsidies also
vary from being targeted to specific activities, as in Germany, to not coming
with any strings attached, as in Norway. The criteria that are used to allocate
subsidies vary from a minimum share of the votes to a share of parliamentary
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seats. Finally, countries differ with respect to the obligation parties have to the
state and the public in terms of financial accountability and transparency. A
summary of how these various elements are applied in African democracies is
presented in table 1. In nine other countries there is legislation but no
information of funding taking place.
Table 1. Public subsidies for parties in African democracies where funding has
been provided, by year of introduction, recipient, allocation criteria and amount.
Country Year of
introdu
ction
Recipient Basic allocation criteria (Amount for
each party/candidate)
Total
amount
available
Benin Law
(90-
023)
Parliamentary
candidates
Presidential
candidates
Reimbursement of campaign expenses for
successful candidates. (Rule for
proportional distributed funding not
implemented)
Candidates must win more than 10% in
presidential election
Decided
by
president
decree
Burkina Faso 1997 Parties election
campaign
Central party
org.
50% distributed proportionally among
the parties in the National Assembly,
50% to parties with candidates in at least
5 of the 45 provinces
Unspecified support between elections
USD
380.000
Cameroon 1990 Political parties To be decided by the President when
necessary
Chad 1993 Grant to new
parties
USD 10.000 for each new party
Egypt N.A Central party
org.
All registered parties (USD 29.000 pr.
Party)
Equatorial
Guinea
N.A Presidential
candidates
Central party
org.
All participants (USD 30.000 each)
All parties (USD 8.900 each)
Gabon 1990 Central party
org.
All parties with a candidate in each
constituency
USD
34.700
Morocco N.A Parties’ election
campaign
The parties receive 20% before the end of
candidate registration, 30% is given to
parties based on the number of candidates
filed, 25% is given to parties based on the
number of votes obtained by each party
in every district, and finally 25% is
distributed based on the number of seats
won.
Total
amount
to be
decided
by Prime
Minister
(1997:
USD 13.6
million)
Mozambique 1999 Central party
org.
Presidential
candidates
1/3 distributed equally among presidential
candidates,
1/3 proportionally to parties represented
in Parliament,
1/3 to all-participating parties based on
number of approved candidates.
USD
340.000
to the
two
largest
parties
Namibia 1997 Central party
org.
Funding confined to parliamentary parties
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Seychelles 1996 Central party
org.
Parties that nominated candidates for the
preceding election, based on percentage of
the votes
USD 1.5
million
South Africa 1996 Central party
org.
Funding limited to parties in national
assembly or in a provincial legislature. A
sum divided equally among parties +
another sum based on proportional
parliamentary representation
USD 9
million
Tanzania 1992
1995
1996-
Law not implemented
USD 9.600 for each presidential
candidate
USD 1.900 pr. Constituency for campaign
costs + USD1.900 for each constituency
won towards administrative costs
Support for parties between elections,
proportional to parliamentary
representation
USD 10
million
for
1996-
2000
Zimbabwe 1992
1997
Central party
org.
Central party
org.
Must hold 15 seats in the national
assembly to receive funds
Funds given to parties receiving 5% in
previous election
In: Saffu and Øhman (2002) Funding Political Parties in Africa, International IDEA handbook
on funding of parties and election campaigns, forthcoming 2002.
The table indicates that in several countries the rules for qualifying for public
funding are ambiguous. In Morocco and in Cameroon, the prime minister and
president, respectively, control whether or not there will be any subsidies at
all. In Benin and in Tanzania the laws enacting subsidies were only partially,
or not at all, implemented. Support for parties and candidates do not
necessarily mean that they are available well in advance of the election
campaign. Equatorial Guinea is a case in point where all candidates were
given USD20.000, but distributed very late. Subsequently, four days before
election an additional USD 10.000 was distributed. Next day the opposition
candidates withdrew from the race ! (Ibid: 10)
It seems at times that public subsidies have been introduced with the full
understanding that it would not lead to an institutionalised party system, as
the case of Gabon illustrates. We cite from Saffu and Øhman’s report:
“At the national conference held in March 1990, the delegates
were invited to form political parties. More than 70 self-declared
parties were formed. Each party was granted 20 million francs
CDA (around US 34.700) and a four-wheel drive vehicle for the
electoral campaign. Most of these parties disappeared after
receiving the state funds and have not reappeared since” (ibid:
10).
Political financing is under-regulated in Africa and it is very difficult to map out
how much public money and other forms of revenue African parties have at
their disposal. In less than one in five countries there are laws that regulate the
raising of revenue. Whether parties are allowed corporate or foreign donations,
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the amounts they are able to receive, disclosure and auditing procedures, and
finally sanctions for breaches are in reality not present. And where there is
legislation, parties have been inclined to circumvent them. In countries that have
provisions for public funding, there are inconsistent, or incomplete, regulations,
like in South Africa, where there are provisions for public but not for foreign
funding. Saffu and Øhman state in the forthcoming International IDEA
Handbook on Political Funding, that the existence of public funding does not
make a significant difference for oppositional parties. The problem is that during
transitions, during constitution-making and in the passing of Electoral Laws the
new leadership has used its position to entrench their dominant positions vis-à-
vis the opposition.
3. Current models of foreign funding
In part, it is unclear what ’international, or foreign, funding implies.
Contributions from individuals residing in a given country may be considered
’foreign’ if the individuals in question do not hold citizenship in the country.
On the other hand, money sent from abroad to a party may not necessarily be
seen as ’foreign’ if the donor is a citizen who lives abroad, temporarily or
permanently. Foreign funding may also be evaluated in different ways
depending on who the donor is: parties in other countries, individuals,
national NGOs, international NGOs, corporations, trade unions, governments
or IGOs.
The short story of foreign funding of political parties
In order to put the issue of foreign funding into perspective we will review the
history of foreign funding based on scattered information given in the
literature on Africa. A useful classification given by Southall and Wood (1998)
divides the history of party funding in Africa into three phases.
First, Southall and Wood point to the early post-war nationalist phase. Here
parties had three sources of income. Some mass based parties managed to
extract fees from their membership. Elite parties, on the other hand, were
involved in patron-client networks where money was provided based on
services rendered to economic elites. However, the dominant form of funding
was external intervention made by foreign agencies or governments giving
funds to nationalist movements in a ploy set out to influence the outcome of
de-colonisation.
The post-colonial phase saw an effective merging of the state and the party.
Party membership subscription was replaced by utilisation of state resources
as the primary income for parties. But as many post-independence countries
retained the single member constituency system of the former colonisers, many
campaigns were self-financing, relying on local bigmen. There was in fact a
rise of one-party states headed by “impatient profiteers” skimming the milk
off a political spoils system.
Important supporters of the pro-democracy movements in this period were the
humanitarian and church based organisations. Based in Western democracies
C M I
8
they provided support for democratic processes by supporting liberation
movements and civic organisations, but it is difficult today to give an estimate
of the extent and the impact of the funding, since much was conducted in
clandestine. Also international party federations, like the Socialist
International, Liberal International, the Christian Democratic International
and the International Democratic Union, provided support for “sister parties”.
But this support seems to have been of limited value for the parties in new
democracies both prior to and after 1989 (Gennip 2000).
The history of party finance in the pre-1989 era is also the tale of the
superpowers' struggle for ideological hegemony. They were largely neutral
towards Africa’s decline into authoritarianism and devoted little effort to
punishing countries that were giving up democratic politics. Military, financial
and ideological assistance was given to client states and liberation and
independence movements to extend their influence. In this global game the
intelligence agencies were the principal players providing secret funding to
either the incumbent regime or oppositional forces, depending on whether the
aim was to destabilise or stabilise the political situation in a country, impose a
“friendly” regime or hinder a political situation from radicalising. Funds were
subsequently sent across borders to provide institutional support for party
organisations, train cadre and to raise the regimes’ legitimacy by holding
democratic or semi-democratic election processes. The result was that many
authoritarian regimes were supported in the name of democracy.
The third phase is marked by the return of multi-partyism in the beginning of
the 1990s. A new branch of the aid industry was born to support and
consolidate the gains made – democracy assistance. In the early 1990s the
emphasis was put on helping countries stage transitional elections and parties
were given support in the electoral processes. Much less effort was directed at
developing party organisations and platforms – the basis for long-term
democratic sustainability. Instead, most effort was put into developing grass-
root movements. Local NGOs and civic associations were drawing material
provisions from and attracting funds from foreign donors (both government
and unofficial).
While the pre-1989 development strategy was focused primarily on
strengthening the government apparatus, the new strategy recognised the
important role of civil society. As the new countries are popularly based
democracies it is imperative to penetrate civil society to gain control over
popular mobilisation. Aid in this new regime is therefore targeted at a host of
different civil society organisations ranging from women and human rights
associations, trade unions, business associations, media and so on. Hearn’s
argument is that developing countries are under “attack” from the Western
world, which is exporting a minimalist definition of democracy that is not
socially progressive, but rather conservative, serving only the interests of
western governments and the international monetary institutions.
One might argue that the picture presented by Hearn is too static and that it
only applies to a few countries. The aim could be to spread good governance
and to reduce poverty without any ulterior motives. But all in all it is
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important to note that the history of foreign intervention in developing
countries is not a glorious one, and that the grim picture presented above is
how many Africans perceive Western democracy assistance. External support
for parties and candidates can backfire in the electoral process and allegations
about foreign funding are being used to portray opposition parties as tools of
foreign governments.
Funding modalities
The post-1989 wave of democratisation created new challenges to the donor
community. In the following section we will review five national strategies
used to support democratic development and particularly political parties.
The German model
Germany, through its political foundations, has the longest experiences in
political assistance to developing countries. The different Stiftungs are closely
affiliated with respective parties in the German Bundestag, and the most
important ones are the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES –SPD),4 Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS –CDU), Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS – FDP),
Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS-CSU) and the Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung (HBS – Die
Grunen). Their initial task was to provide civic education to the German
population. The FES decided in the late fifties to expand its activities to
working outside Germany, and others were soon to follow. The Stiftungs
receive almost all of their funds for their international activities from the
government, but have full autonomy in the use of the funds. The different
foundations receive a total of DM 350 million (4% of the total foreign aid
budget) annually (Mair 2000). The funds are shared among the parties
roughly on the basis of the size of the parliamentary party groups. At present
the Stiftungs have spread their international activities and have a field presence
in more than 100 countries.
Contrary to other donors, the Stiftungs focus on long-term partnerships with
particular organisations and political parties. But more short term funding of
new political initiatives is also provided. The different Stiftungs are committed
to the partisan support of specific sections of the political and social realm,
with a special focus on interest and focus groups, as well as the media. With
the different Stiftungs offering partisan support to different sectors of the
political realm the idea is that this will make sure that all sections of society
gets voice and the accusations of being partisan and interventionist will be
reduced. Although the Stiftungs have been active in developing countries for
over thirty years, their involvement in the first part of this period has been
criticised for co-operation with authoritarian and single party regimes. In the
past, co-operation with specific political parties was extensive (KANU,
FRELIMO and CCM), but many of the parties in power hindered democratic
development. Hence the Stiftungs were forced to drop parties in their support
programmes (with South Africa as an exception), and chose to focus on civic
education programmes, interest and advocacy groups, media, the
strengthening of party political think tanks, parliaments and electoral
                                           
4 See for example http://www.fes.de/ and http://www3.fnst.de/reda/
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commissions. However, the present funding strategy is under constant review
as the Stiftungs recognise the important role of parties in a democracy as a
link between society and the state (Hauck 2000).
The American model
The US party political support programmes for new democracies are executed
by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican
Institute (IRI).5 The IRI has a staff of about 65 persons while the NDI is
bigger, with a staff of approximately 230 persons. Both have since the mid-
eighties instigated programmes funded primarily through the umbrella body
responsible for the allocation of democratisation funds, the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), which has an annual budget of
approximately US$ 32 million. But also USAID is active in promoting party
related activities, channelling about US$ 10 million to the NDI and IRI. NDI
is the most active on the African continent with reported activities in 15
countries. Compared to the German Stiftungs, the NDI and the IRI are much
less autonomous in character, as programmes have to conform to guidelines
set by the US government) (Hauck 2000). This has meant that the American
institutes often have supported non-communist parties. In addition, cuts in the
NED by USAID have almost transformed the IRI and the NDI into
subcontractors to USAID, which defines the terms and references for their
engagement abroad.
The NDI and the IRI execute projects on elections, civic education,
parliamentary strengthening, and political party capacity building. The party
support is directed towards the training of members of parliament and
technical assistance for party building, including election monitoring and
campaign assistance (mostly formulation of programmes). In each country
several of the major parties receive support, rather than one particular sister
party. Who gets chosen is decided in-house, based on an analysis of the policy
orientations and strengths of the individual parties. This has again led to
accusations by political leaders in development countries that the Americans
are interventionist, partisan and oriented towards Western democracy.
The British model
In the UK the Westminster Foundation (WF) has since 1992 provided support
for the building of pluralistic democratic institutions overseas.6 The main
geographical areas are East and Central Europe, while the Anglophone
countries are the main area of focus on the African continent. The Foundation
is a “non-departmental public body” and is as such not affiliated with any
particular political party, and the Foundation tries to have a neutral role in
democratisation assistance. Its particular focus is on giving technical assistance
to electoral processes, supporting the independent media, trade unions,
political NGOs and parliaments and the strengthening of political parties.
                                           
5 See http://www.ndi.org/ and http://www.iri.org/
6 See http://www.wfd.org/
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The British government funds the WF with an annual grant of GBP 4 million
(1999). Of this sum 50% is channelled abroad via the Foundation and 50%
via British political parties. The resources handled by the Foundation serve to
carry out cross-party projects with a range of parties in a country. In addition,
funds are spent supporting non-party projects like media, civil society, trade
unions and the electoral process. The remaining 50% are spent on support to
individual political parties channelled through the UK political parties
(Labour, Conservative and the Liberal Party). Support projects are primarily
technical, and relate to party building, party organisation and electoral
support on a party-to-party basis.
The Dutch model
The Dutch approach is somewhat different from the strategies described
above. The Dutch Foundation for the new South Africa (NZA), was
established as an instrument for stabilising the particular situation of the post-
apartheid South Africa. The NZA was established and supported by all parties
in the Dutch parliament, with the exception of the extreme right. Its funding is
made 100% by the Dutch government and it is unique in that all parties in
South Africa and later Mozambique (1997) receive support. The formula used
in South Africa made 25% of the budget available to all parties on an equal
basis and the remaining 75% was distributed according to the number of seats
held by a party in the national assembly. Parties outside the assembly received
no support after the 1994 elections as to avoid formation of new parties
simply to access funds.
According to its statutes the NZA shall initiate activities aimed at supporting
electoral campaigns, democracy education and capacity building for political
parties. The support given to political parties should strengthen the party
organisation, spread democratic values from cadres up to the leadership level,
and strengthen party infrastructure. In April 2000 the Netherlands Institute
for Multiparty Democracy (IMD) replaced the NZA. The new foundation has
decided to explore the possibilities of expanding its activities to Latin America
and Asia. The organisational structure of the IMD consists of an executive
committee of representatives from the Dutch political parties, and each party
appoints a program officer to work for IMD. The officers represent the IMD
and not the parties they are appointed by and are to be responsible for co-
ordinating activities with partners in the developing countries. The foundation
also has a supervisory board, a secretariat and a representative in
Mozambique.
The Swedish model
Since 1995 seven foundations closely aligned to Swedish political parties have
been involved in channelling funds to “sister parties” in developing countries
and in East and Central Europe.7 An estimate of 55 million SEK have been
spent in a pilot project administered through the Swedish development agency
                                           
7 The Swedish organisations are small, often consisting of one person supported by a board. In
almost half the cases, the person responsible is also the “international secretary” of the
parties.
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(Sida) with the aim of developing functioning pluralistic party systems in new
democracies. Swedish parties represented in the Riksdag are given funds based
on electoral strength and are given autonomy over which parties they want to
support and in what ways. Although political parties are the premier
beneficiaries (three-quarters) in the Swedish funding scheme, the last few years
have seen growing support to youth and women’s organisations plus
independent organisations. The party-based support has primarily been spent
on policy formulation activities, followed by organisational and campaign
based activities. Seminars and conferences are the most common methods,
followed by the sending of Swedish advisors.
A recent evaluation of the Swedish model concludes that the limited funds
available for distribution by the Swedish parties give rise to organisational
entities that are small and unevenly formalised.8 The administrative costs are
high, with party entities based in Sweden receiving one-forth of the funds.
Despite administration being carried out by Sida the development agency has
very little influence (by choice) over the running and the direction of the
funding scheme, leading to several problematic aspects. For instance, over
65% of the funds was allocated to parties in East and Central Europe while
only 35% are given to developing countries, although the intention was an
opposite split. The evaluation report also makes the point that 45% of the
support is given to parties with less than 10% voter support. On a positive
note both the Swedish parties and the recipient parties approve of the
informality of the party co-operation that has led to close personal contacts. In
fact, the close personal contacts are held by the recipients to be just as
important as the monetary support provided. This means that there is a
positive process, were the Swedish parties share their know-how on issues like
election campaigns and internal democracy with their younger counterparts.
But in its assessment of the primary objective of the project, the development
of a pluralistic party system, the evaluation report finds it difficult to claim it
has been a success. Apart from the difficulty of assessing the impact of the
various initiatives, they point out that support for individual parties in an
uncoordinated manner may be far removed from an analysis of the needs of
the party system and the democracy at large.
4. A comparison of the modalities of foreign funding
In this comparison we seek to analyse how the different funding models are
organised and what consequences this implies. Then we take a closer look at
what the different national strategies include in their support programmes.
Lastly, we investigate how the different funding schemes have tried to limit the
interventionist problem associated with foreign funding.
The Swedish and early German models have similarities in that party based
external organisations channel support to so called “sister parties”.9 In the US
                                           
8 Uggla, F. et. al. “Rapport från utværdering av stødet till de partianknutna organisationerna,
Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala universitetet”.
9 The German Ministry of Economic Co-operation now outright prohibits German
foundations from giving any direct support to parties (South Africa is an exception).
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the IRI and NDI perform the same function, but their support programmes in
the different countries give funds to all relevant parties in these countries. The
Westminster Foundation in the UK has two components – one is party to
party based and the other is centrally administered by the WF itself, covering
all parties in a country. The Dutch model, on the other hand, is administered
through a single body (the IMD) and covers all parties in the recipient
country. These findings can be summarised in the following matrix.
Figure 1: Classification of funding models
Sweden,
Germany,
WF (party
based
Unofficial
support
US (NDI,
IRI)
WF, NZA
(IMD)
One common feature in the party administered arrangements of Sweden and
Germany seems to be a low level of co-operation and co-ordination between
the different national actors both abroad and domestically. Domestically this
means that the lessons learnt by the parties are not shared, alas better practice
does not develop. In the co-operating countries we see from evaluations that
when a few parties in the party systems are singled out for support there seems
to be little co-ordinated efforts. Rather this hap-hazardous way of operating
prevents any gains in relation to the party systems and democracy as a whole.
The Dutch arrangement seems to have been successful in this regard by
limiting its efforts to fewer countries. Through the support of all parties above
a certain threshold the party system as a whole gets a co-ordinated boost.
One important factor that distinguishes these different models from each other
is their size. That is, the German, US and to some extent the British models are
of a magnitude that can sustain permanent presence and engage in long-term
projects in many countries. This gives an opportunity to attain detailed
information of the ever interchanging political situation and gives the
opportunity to limit funding based only on the needs of the recipients, but
rather enables the donor to take the needs of the whole party system and
indeed democracy at large into consideration. But again the Dutch with their
limited resources have been able to overcome this problem with their selection
of fewer countries. The funding strategy of the main actors that have
institutionalised mechanisms to deal with foreign funding is summarised in the
following model10.
                                           
10 This is a modified version of the model suggested by Gennip 2001.
Administrator
Party Centralised unit
 Recipient
Single party
All parties
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Table 2: Forms of assistance by donors
Forms of
assistance
Actors
Assistance to
civil society
(unions, media,
human rights
etc.)
Pro-democracy
assistance
(rule of law,
constitutional
support, cross
cutting party
training, civic
education etc.)
Technical
assistance to
political parties
(training,
election
campaigning,
party
management,
support for
think-tanks etc.)
Budgetary
assistance to
political parties
(for funding of
party core and
for capacity-
building
activities)
British WF and
parties British
parties
Yes, through WF
(non party
channel)
Yes, through WF Yes, between
British parties
and likeminded
parties in other
countries
Limited, through
British parties
American NDI
and IRI
Yes Yes Yes Limited, in
exceptional cases
German political
foundations
Yes Yes Limited, with the
exception of
South Africa
No
Netherlands
NZA(IMD)
No Yes Yes Limited
Swedish party
entities
Limited Limited Yes Yes
The five different models presented above show how different countries have
chosen to structure their support to political parties and party systems. What
seems clear is that most arrangements want to limit lump sum money transfers
to the party purses. Rather, support is given to capacity building within the
parties and “softer” forms of funding like democracy assistance and
supporting civil society. Another aspect of the same quest for legitimacy of
foreign funding is to limit the national funding agency’s (government)
influence over the funding scheme. In all countries funding is given within the
overall policy framework provided by government, but to avoid undue
influence all countries under review, except the US, have arrived at different
models to prevent the party finance from being state sponsored. In all donor
countries the administrator has been put at an arm’s length from government,
using foundations or institutes that have got a high degree of autonomy. Also,
we see that the US Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the use of development
assistance “directly or indirectly to influence the outcome of any elections in a
country”. One factor that is not so obvious is that many support programmes
are related to the parliamentary strength of the parties in the donor country,
and not in the recipient country. This applies especially to the multiple body –
low funding influence in figure 2 below.
Are donors imposing Western political life to Africa – and again being
interventionist? Although some African leaders use the existence of foreign
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funds to discredit the opposition, managers of the different funding schemes
feel that they have been successful in avoiding being interventionist.11 The
history of foreign funding goes back more than 40 years, and in this period
donors have gained considerable experience and have subsequently changed
their modus operandi. Most donors have taken a cautious approach to
funding parties directly or to engage with non-democracies in different forms.
Figure 2: Classification of funding influence
NZA
(IMD),
WF
n.a
German
Stiftungs,
WF (Party
based), SE
(Political
Parties)
US (NDI, IRI)
In addition to the funding provided by funding agencies, NGOs, business
interests and development agencies there is also a myriad of party-to-party
contacts across continents. It is only in the UK that the support pattern has
been institutionalised into one common institutional arrangement - the
Westminster Foundation. Elsewhere, like in France, political parties have
contacts with their African counterparts, which supplies the fragile parties
with much needed expertise on a one-to-one basis. Denmark on the other
hand has not implemented international party subsidy schemes.
5. Norwegian parties’ involvement in democratisation
processes
The Norwegian political parties’ present contacts with and support of political
parties in new democracies is unevenly spread out among the parties and it is
impossible to mention all contacts and projects, so we will limit the
presentation to what the parties themselves have brought to our attention12.
The Labour Party (A) has an ongoing dialogue and good contacts with African
sister parties, but its primary involvement is in East/Central Europe and the
Balkans. Here the East and Central Europe Programme of the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has supported projects on democracy and
                                           
11 Summary of the Hague Conference on Network Democracy, November 25, 2001.
Available on: http://www.nimd.org/2001/11_25_conference_summary_english.htm
12 Based on questionnaires sent to all relevant parties in the Norwegian Storting.
Autonomy of party institutions
 Low High
Single body
Multiple
bodies
Executing
organisations
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institution building. On the African continent the parties have no concrete
projects due to economic constraints but express great interest in extending
their involvement.
The second largest party, the Conservative Party (H), is also actively involved
in support to parties in East and Central Europe and the Balkans funded
through programmes of the MFA. The party indicates that it has no funds of
its own to get involved in projects outside Europe. Contacts towards other
regions have only been sporadic, and based on the party’s participation in the
International Democratic Union. Domestically, the party has invited
representatives from co-operating parties to participate in an “election
seminar” every election year. This has had a bonding component where
Norwegian party officials have participated in educational activities at
national and regional levels abroad.
The Progress Party (FrP) is the Norwegian party that takes the most cautious
approach to supporting foreign political parties and processes. There exist
little personalised contacts and no institutional co-operation with parties in
new democracies. The party harbours a great deal of scepticism to democracy
aid and feels that support should be given conditionally on a proven record of
better practices. Also the party feels that any formalised support to parties and
democracies at large should be less based on the bureaucracy and more on the
involvement of the political parties.
The Socialist Left Party (SV) does not have a formalised co-operation with
African parties, but has ongoing projects with political parties in Central
America and the Balkans. The Central American project with the title
“Cooperation and Democracy Development” is funded through NORAD and
is one of the few concrete projects concentrated at developing political party
capacity in developing countries by a Norwegian political party. Execution of
the project is twofold: firstly local level co-operation between local entities in
Norway and in the co-operating parties; secondly, a party-core component on
educating local councillors and party members. The project facilitates
exchange of party members to national conferences and the distribution of
funds directly to the co-operating parties. In the Balkans the Norwegian
Socialist Left Party is involved in ongoing knowledge transfers and more
specifically visits to co-operating parties in conjecture with elections. The
party has also arranged a seminar in Montenegro on building democracy for
local councillors. This project has been funded by the Norwegian MFA and by
the party’s own funds. It is interesting to note that the party with an active
project portfolio emphasises the need for clear auditing procedures in a future
institutionalised Norwegian party based support programme.
The Center Party (SP) has long-standing bilateral contacts with different
agriculturally based parties in Eastern/Central Europe and the Balkans. There
has been exchange of party officials to national conferences, the party has
helped develop party platforms for sister parties, and there has been co-
operation between the youth and women’s associations. Some parts of this co-
operation have been supported by the Norwegian MFA. Contact with African
parties is very limited and when it does happen it is indirectly through the
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International Network of Centre Parties. The Centre Party, like many of the
other parties, emphasises the positive contribution made by their women’s and
youth leagues in fundraising and solidarity work for poor countries. The party
is very positive to expanding its involvement in a Norwegian institutionalised
support programme for political parties in the South.
The Liberal Party (V), like the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, has
better-developed links with East/Central Europe and the Balkans than with
Africa. Projects have been supported by the MFA and have even incorporated
participation by Bosnian politicians at the latest party congress and election
campaign. Involvement outside Europe is limited to visiting sister parties and
doing election observation in Malawi, together with the Labour party and the
Christian People’s Party (Krf). As in the case of the other parties’ participation
in the Internationals, in this case the Liberal international, has resulted in
contacts, but no actual projects have materialised. And again, like in the case
of the other parties, the party expresses great interest in expanding its
international involvement, but lack of funds have been the inhibiting factor
until now.
The picture that emerges from surveying the Norwegian political parties is
that their present involvement is geared towards East/Central Europe and the
Balkans. If a future support programme is to reach its goals of supporting the
least developed parties in the most underdeveloped parts of the world much
capacity building has to be done on the part of the Norwegian parties. A
question that arises is whether Norwegian parties have the capacity to select
and maintain suitable co-operating partners. This is a problematique we will
return to in the next section. The degree of involvement is at present
determined by the size (resources) and international foreign policy
involvement of the parties. Resources and not lack of interest seems to be the
factor that has limited the parties’ involvement until now. An institutionalised
arrangement for supporting political parties may go a long way in triggering
the interest that is present among Norwegian political parties.
6. A framework for party funding
As pointed out by Peter Burnell in the book Funding Democratisation, “The
definitive formula for optimising the funding of political competition eludes
even the longest lived and most prestigious democracies” (Burnell and Ware
1998) as recent years’ events in Germany, France and Italy illustrate. Nor is it
easy to regulate political funding. No other country has as many, and as
detailed, regulations of campaign finance as the United States; yet the
loopholes and unintended effects require a constant adjustment of the
regulations. There are many reasons for being hesitant of funding parties in
Africa.
The pros and cons of foreign funding
The problematic nature of political finance in general and the particular
problem associated with external party funding have lead to several arguments
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for why this type of activity should be avoided. The most frequently used
argument against foreign funding is, as noted before, that it is seen as attempts
by actors external to a political system to influence the outcome of national
processes, such as elections. This type of influence distorts a fundamental
democratic principle: that the election of representatives should express the
political preferences of the politically enfranchised citizens. The argument is
often ended by posing the rhetorical question: how many Western
governments would allow large sums of money to be given by foreign
governments to one or a few of their own parties?13
Another argument is that the social basis for functioning parties and party
systems is a well-organised and pluralistic civil society. If parties can rely on
foreign funding, there will be no need for parties to connect to civil society.
The argument is that money given directly to the party will create distance
between the party and the electorate. The party will be less inclined to
represent the views of the citizens, and oppositional parties will have fewer
incentives to challenge the government, as the party already is in a
comfortable position. Another argument along the same line is that money
given directly to the party core will reduce internal democracy in the parties.
When the party leadership has got sufficient funds it can buy many of the
services it would otherwise need members for. As influence over the party’s
policies is the “payment” members seek for their efforts it is safe to assume
that a wealthy party leadership will fast become a monolithic leadership.
Moreover, foreign funding has been accused of undermining democracy by
creating self-sufficient parties monetary wise. ‘Party entrepreneurs’ will be
encouraged to establish parties in order to tap into internationally available
funds. The result will be a fragmentation of the party system – a development
hardly conducive to democratic consolidation. Particularly in the early phase
of democratisation there will be a number of parties that will not be able to
survive. Early international assistance to multiple parties may artificially
prolong the life of parties that have little basis in the electorate.
And finally, many students of African democratisation point out that African
parties have little in common with their counterparts in Europe and North
America. European parties have originated from religious, linguistic, regional
and economic cleavages that were politicised during the democratisation
processes in Europe. These types of parties are not necessarily replicated
elsewhere – nor can it be an objective that they should be. Some afropessimists
point to that some parties have secessionist objectives based on racial and
tribal agendas, while other parties may not be particularly inclined to support
democratic government. Thus, it may not be easy to establish criteria with
which one can identify which parties should qualify for foreign assistance.
All these arguments have led many observers to conclude that as foreign
funding is both unethical and counterproductive it should be an unwanted
instrument in democracy assistance.
                                           
13 Note the controversy over the ‘China connection’ and former Vice-President Alan Gore.
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On the other hand, there are also arguments in favour of foreign funding of
political parties. The main reasons in favour of this policy are:
a) political parties are integrated components of democratic governance;
they cannot be avoided. Support for democratisation processes is
incomplete if parties are totally neglected.
b) since political parties exist, a viable party system requires a fair chance
for non-governing parties to compete with incumbent parties, at least in
the long run.
While ideally, political parties should develop out of national resources alone,
the level of economic development in African states does not create a surplus
sufficient to build mass parties from foundations in civil society. In addition to
supporting the growth of civil society, organisations that are able to aggregate
the interest already present in civil society should be encouraged to play the
role of facilitator and mediator for the voice of the population into national
politics. Democracy is not only about periodic elections but depends on the
continuous deliberations of civil society. Political parties provide a direct
channel into government that can transform the ideas that emerge into
government action.
Today African parties are most often fluid organisations without any clear
ideology, policies, membership or formalised procedures and they are most
often based on one strong patron. In a liberal democracy citizens must have a
fair chance to express their views. This is in very many African countries
distorted by an undemocratic power structure, by a lack of knowledge about
democratic procedures, and by difficulties in forming political organisations
that can contest the incumbent government.
A public policy that includes funding of political parties must avoid:
a) imposing a particular set of parties from abroad, or
b) a particular organisational model, or
c) excessive fragmentation of the party system.
The overall objective must be to stimulate the development of parties for the
purpose of enhancing democratic governance. For this overall objective there
is no particular party system or type of party that can fit all polities. Although
the objective is NOT to make African parties similar to Norwegian ones, it is
nevertheless an important argument in favour of party funding that major
countries like the US, Germany and Britain are engaged in this type of activity.
Just as is the case with the Netherlands, Norway represents a different kind of
political system. Providing knowledge and information from political systems
that are organised very differently from the big powers increases the range of
possible models that can be adapted to fit national circumstances. Adaptation
of models from abroad is not the same as imposition of models. No political
system, anywhere, develops its political institutions in isolation from trends
and models elsewhere. However, the opportunity to select appropriate models
depends on available information and knowledge of how various democratic
institutions and mechanisms functions. That is why small countries should be
involved in supporting political parties. One should also bear in mind the
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reverse effect that funding of parties may have on Norwegian parties. If
Norwegian parties become involved with counterparts in African countries,
this will also lead to increased knowledge and understanding of developmental
issues amongst the Norwegian participants. In turn, this will feed back into
the formulation of Norwegian development policy.
Putting the framework into operation
The primary goal of a Norwegian funding scheme, as specified in the 2002
government budget14, is: [“to help develop functioning pluralistic political
systems in developing countries”].15 The objective is to build democratic
organisational capacity based on knowledge transfers, counselling and
international exchange through long-term aid projects. It is specified that
special attention should be given to projects that are cross cutting and
supportive of women’s activities in the recipient countries. Direct financial
subsidies to receiving parties should be avoided, and caution should be taken
when countries come close to election times.
Four issues need to be addressed if support for parties is to be introduced:
a) How should countries be selected
We have emphasised the integrated nature of parties within the overall
governing structure. Support for political parties must therefore fit with the
general objectives of democracy assistance. This is most likely to be achieved if
party support is directed to countries that already receive substantial aid for
other democracy building purposes. By linking party support to the main
receiving countries, it will be easier to maintain a long-term programme, as
well as the need for co-ordination with other activities.
b) How should support be organised
The problematic nature of foreign funding requires a separation between the
source of the funding and the receiving parties. The Dutch, British and
American models all build on a joint national institution for this purpose.
Presumably, this creates better national co-ordination than the Swedish model
does. It also reduces the part of the budget that is spent by Swedish parties on
internal administration. Thus, foreign funding should be introduced following
the creation of a unit on the Norwegian side with representatives from
political parties, similar to that of the Dutch IMD. This unit should not be
limited to party representatives, but involve other actors with expertise in
development issues and democracy building issues, such as research institutes.
The Dutch model holds many advantages. First of all it reduces the
organisational overhead. Secondly, it reduces the potential for being
interventionist, as money and trainers are sent to co-operating parties in the
South in the name of a foundation. The Dutch have also tried to include all
relevant parties in the recipient country into the support programme, with an
emphasis on crosscutting support activities. In addition, the Dutch model is
able to generate strong ownership among the participants on both sides, as the
                                           
14 Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement, St.prp.nr.1 Kap. 160, Post 72.
15 Our translation.
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IMD model is demand-driven. This means that political parties in the South
are asked to submit proposals for capacity-building projects. Another feature
of the Dutch model that is relevant for Norway is the selection of fewer
countries. The Dutch, like the future Norwegian model, will have relatively
modest funds available compared to the German, American and British
models. So, if an institutionalised Norwegian support programme to political
parties is to reach its overarching goal of developing functioning pluralistic
political systems in developing countries, support needs to be focused on a few
countries.
c) What kind of activities should be supported
As the need for assistance may vary considerably from one country to another
and from party to party, it may be difficult to specify exactly what kind of
activities that should be funded in every case. Below (Appendix 1), we suggest
a series of possible activities that could be, but not necessarily have to be, part
of the support schemes.
d) What parties should be supported
We have drawn attention to the potential conflict between support for
individual parties versus support for the party system and the need to avoid
contributing to party fragmentation. A possible model could be that support
for parties is channelled through an inter-party unit in the recipient countries.
The advantage of this model is that no particular party can be ‘victimised’ as
being held hostage to foreign interests. Moreover, an inter-party unit could be
a forum for discussion of issues that relate to parties in general, rather than to
each one of them, such as electoral systems, electoral and campaign
regulations. (Not all funds need to be allocated to such inter-party purposes).
Parties eligible for participation in each country should be selected on a
combination of criteria, rather than on single criteria. Among such criteria are:
commitment to democratic government, including abstention from using
violence or inciting to the use of violence. Parties that are able to nominate
candidates in a minimum number of constituencies should be supported,
rather than entrepreneurial one-man parties. Support could be channelled to
parties that have been able to sustain themselves over some time, rather than
to flash-pan parties. Parties that can demonstrate support from civil society or
interest groups may be preferred over parties with no visible basis in society.
Concluding remarks
If democracy is to be entrenched in Africa it needs to be strengthened from
within. Any support for foreign funding of political parties might therefore
seem a bit tainted. But support is not about imposing models from outside,
but rather about giving support to what are national processes. The purpose
of strengthening parties is to improve the overall quality of the political
system. Although there are good reasons to advocate party support as part of
a general development policy, it is also worth noticing that this is a field where
it may be difficult to identify immediate results. Party system development
does not proceed in a linear way; long-term engagements are therefore
necessary. Nor will all types of support be met with success. The development
of parties is as much a result of factors in the parties’ economic, social and
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cultural environments as it is dependent on internal party factors. The
objective is therefore not to make sure that every existing party in a given
polity survives, but to reduce the arbitrariness with which parties now seem to
be created as well as disappearing.
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Appendix 1
Relating to point c), on what activities that should be encouraged, we have
found the political party support platform used by USAID relevant. In
addition we have added some points [] to make the list exhaustive.
Organisational focus:
1. Political party planning: strategic planning, development of research skills
for planning purposes.
2. Organisational development: party building, professionalisation, training
in organisational management, [this will include exchange of key personel
for training purposes].
3. Local/regional party organisation: organisational linkages – national-local,
co-ordination of organisational activities, programmes.
4. Resource development: allocation of budgetary resources within party
organisation.
5. Message development: policy agenda formulating, party image building,
party platform development.
6. Membership recruitment: membership development, membership
management, volunteer recruitment, volunteer management.
7. Fund raising: the financing of party/candidate campaigns, campaign
finance laws, [cross-cutting ethics programmes on “money in politics”].
8. Media relations: media training, developing messages for media coverage.
Electoral focus:
1. Communications strategies: communication skills, party outreach, intra-
party communications.
2. Voter participation: voter identification, voter mobilisation, voter
contracting, get-out-the-vote efforts.
3. Campaign strategy/planning: campaign management, administration.
4. Candidate recruitment: candidate selection, candidate training, leadership
training.
5. Grass-roots outreach: grass-roots participation, grass-roots mobilisation,
door to door canvassing.
6. Women and young people: programming targeted at mobilising and
training women and young people in political party activism.
Governance/political process focus:
1. [cross party political education, with a view to foster a deeper
understanding of the principles, institutions and processes that nurture and
sustain multi-party democracy].
2. Legislative party building: party transitions in government, organising
political opposition in government, organising political opposition in
government.
3. Legal framework: electoral law reform, constitutional framework, ballot
security/fraud.
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4. Coalition building: inter-party relations in legislatures, [projects designed
to promote confidence building and co-operation among the parties
outside the legislative arena].
5. Party-poll observer training: election monitoring.
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